Analysis of the collusive tactics implemented by the National Wrestling Alliance (NWA) and the territorial wresting system at large by Sparzo, Nicholas
Analysis of the Collusive Tactics Implemented by the National Wrestling Alliance 
(NWA) and the Territorial Wrestling System at Large 
An Honors Thesis (HONR 499) 
by 
Nicholas Sparzo 
Thesis Advisor 
Dr. Cecil Bohanon 
Ball State University 
Muncie, Indiana 
December 2016 
Expected Date of Graduation 
May2017 
Abstract 
Professional wrestling, the enigmatic medium of entertainment enjoyed by millions to this day, 
was once practiced and distributed in a manner different from what most modem fans are 
accustomed to experiencing. Rather than one company, like the WWE, bringing their menagerie 
of performers to various locations and across television sets throughout out the world, the 
majority of professional wrestling used to be provided on a local level, with various industry 
members controlling the sport within their· city or region. A collection of these providers would 
go on to unify their efforts, creating a group called the National Wrestling Alliance. This 
"NWA" quite literally aligned its members into a collaborative effort to shield one another's 
location of control, or "territory," from any threats within the market. Whether these potential 
threats came from outside competition or from insubordination within the organization itself, the 
various alliance members were there to help eliminate any hardship experienced by their peers. 
Such practices provide several illustrations of the economic concept referred to as "collusion." In 
this piece, I analyze the National Wrestling Alliance's use of collusion to achieve security and 
power in the professional wrestling industry. My analysis ofthe collusive practices spans from 
the creation of the National Wrestling Alliance, throughout its life as a collusive body, to its fall 
from its position of economic power. 
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1 
Introduction and Brief History 
Today, even consumers who take no part in the enjoyment of wrestling know the name of 
John Cena, who could be called the franchise player of World Wrestling Entertainment (WWE). 1 
Mr. Cena is only the most recent in the long line oftop-name wrestlers that the WWE has used in 
its ongoing reign as the leading entity in professional wrestling.2 However, the WWE has not 
always been upon the top of the mountain. If one was to look back in time between 40 and 60 
years, past John Cena, The Rock, and even Hulk Hogan, it would be apparent that very a 
different entity was controlling wrestling. 
The National Wrestling Alliance (herein referred to as the NWA or the Alliance) was·cut 
from a different cloth than the WWE. Rather than a single company controlling wrestling, the 
NW A was made up of regional booking agents and promoters, each controlling wrestling in their 
own territory, with the goal of working together to protect the interests of the collective group.3 
Such complex coordination might even be referred to as collusion. In fact, the story of the NW A, 
as well as ofthe territory days of wrestling in its entirety, provide an extensive list of real-world 
examples of economic collusion. This piece aims to analyze the territorial days of professional 
wrestling and to identify said period as a case study that illustrates the lifetime of a collusive 
agreement. This will be done by examining the power the NW A and affiliated territories held, 
determining how this power was maintained, and understanding the factors that brought about 
the demise of said power. 
There are two methods that will be used to audit the NWA on its collusive practices 
throughout this piece. The first and most direct method will be to apply economic knowledge and 
theory to a given situation in order to show that the actions of the NWA match the concept of 
collusion on a definitional basis. 
The second approach will be the comparison of the NWA's practices to the business 
practices of organizations in other industries. One ofthese such industries deserves special 
explanation. 
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For while the pre-scripted nature of professional wrestling has been common knowledge 
for decades at this point, this has not always been the case. Much ofthe NWA's early tenure, 
arguably the period of its utmost strength, were during a time when the art of professional 
grappling was still considered to be a real sporting event. The booking agents and promoters 
were required to be licensed by the state athletic commissions-entities that manage and oversee 
the practices of combat sports-in order to legally engage in any portion of the professional 
wrestling industry.4 Further, it can certainly be argued that there exist many similarities between 
sports and professional wrestling. From the athletic aptitude required to the methods of offering 
the product to live audiences and through television, the two industries draw enough parallels 
that temporarily lumping simulated competition with pure competition, for the sake of 
comparative analysis, should be appropriate. 5 And given the availability of material written about 
the collusive practices in athletics throughout the years, said comparisons will be quite 
beneficial. 
Before going further in the discussion, a brief history of the NWA is necessary. In the 
1940's, wrestling was run, at least in part, by another "NWA." The National Wrestling 
Association, a professional wrestling entity controlled by various state athletic commission 
members, governed a "world" heavyweight championship widely considered the official version 
of the title. 6 The man in charge of the title' s bookings, Tim Packs of St. Louis, used his influence 
on the champion's schedule to gain hefty power within the wrestling industry, particularly in the 
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Midwest.7 
Though several agent-promoters tried to break free from the crushing grasp of the 
Association and Packs, it was not until 1948 that the first steps towards a new governing body 
were taken.8 On July 18th, in Waterloo Iowa, Packs' adversaries Max Clayton (Omaha), Orville 
Brown (Kanasas City), "Pinkie" George (Des Moines), Sam Muchnik (St. Louis), and Wally 
Karbo (on behalf of Tony Stretcher, Minneapolis), met to combine a recycled name and method 
of cooperation, thus generating a new wrestling entity within the industry, the National Wrestling 
Alliance.9 
The member body of this new "fraternity" consisted entirely of regional booking agents, 
who owned the contracts of area wrestlers and booked them to appear at events run in cities 
throughout the region, in exchange for a fee. 10 These booking agents would in tum represent the 
numerous promoters-those who hosted wrestling at various venues but did not own wrestler 
contracts themselves- within their territories." In addition to holding control over a region's 
wrestlers, booking agents usually doubled as the promoters ofthe cornerstone city in a territory, 
having a large consumer base at their disposa1. 12 Thus, the title ofNWA member could be seen 
as the end product of a formally established hierarchy that favored promoters who already had 
advantages in the form of human capital and bountiful markets. 
On top of serving the needs of their respective territories, these "booker-members" 
became bound to each other by agreeing to protect one another from the authoritarian rule of 
those such as Packs and the National Wrestling Association.13 The second meeting in September 
added more members and fine-tuned the bylaws to which each member would adhere, including 
the mutual recognition of their own world heavyweight charnpion. 14 
Though the intended domain ofthe NWA was to be the Midwestern United States, this 
would not stay the case for long. 15 Within a few years' time, the organization would expand to 
include members not only throughout the entirety of the United States, but also international 
wrestling agent-promoters from Canada, -Mexico, and Japan. 16 Less than five years after the 
initial Waterloo, Iowa meeting, the Alliance was sporting nearly 40 different members. 17 
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Chapter 1 
The Collusive Practices 
Now that the establishment of the NW A and the broad definition of its goals have been 
outlined, the idea of collusion must be more clearly defined. Why is the collaboration of these 
wrestling territories worth closer examination? Several different industries contain members who 
· are part of an overarching organization. For instance; the National Society of Accountants (NSA) 
is an organization that strives to have all accounting professionals as members and to help each 
member achieve in the field. 18 The association also offers a variety of events and gatherings that 
can aid members in fulfilling their career goals goals. 19 
Further, it is not uncommon for representatives of different organizations within the 
same market to cooperate on a variety of business-related subjects.20 Where do these examples 
diverge from the actions taken by the NW A? What makes their practices collusive rather than 
cooperative ?21 
To understand, one must first comprehend the economic defmition of collusion. Penned, 
in this case, by Robert C. Marshall and Leslie M. Marx, collusion is the coordination between 
firms to significantly suppress rivalry.22 Competition often reduces the earnings of firms, which 
logically means that a reduction of competition within the industry can allow the colluding firms 
to enjoy a higher profit from doing business.23 Such collusive agreements, knoWfl as cartels, can 
increase the profits ofthe involved firms through mutually raising prices and/or lowering the 
quality of a given product.24 This allows the cartel members to conduct business with 
substantially less fear that their products will compete against products with a superior value, 
thus allowing members to tum a higher profit.25 
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However, while the colluding business members benefit, another group suffers due to 
collusion. The buyers in the market where collusion takes place, provided they offer no 
resistance, are forced to concede to the new, restricted product offered by the cartel, or leave the 
market for said product, either decision resulting in a loss to the market. 26 Such manipulation of 
the market can be so impactful on consumers that in the United States there exist legislation, 
often referred to as Antitrust Laws, which serves to dissuade firms from engaging in collusion.27 
Herein lies the significance of the actions taken by the NW A. For while an array of 
arguments could be made about how the initially identified examples benefit their respective 
markets, the evidence suggests that the same could not be said about the NW A. Within the 
group's bylaws, there existed many rules conducive to collusive behavior. 
The best place is to start is with the first bylaw, which stated that each member had the 
right to run his respective territory without interference from other NWA members.28 Such a rule 
has a distinct possibility of being included in a given cartel agreement.29 In addition, given that 
each member ran his own part of the country (world, in some cases), with each geographic area 
containing varying populations, one could argue that the bylaw promotes the cartel practice of 
maintaining the current market share of each member firm. 30 
However, the fact that these promoters were already geographically split may lead some 
to defend this first bylaw. The practice of one firm controlling a particular market in a certain 
geographic area is not unheard of or even necessarily illegal. Such firms are referred to as natural 
monopolies, and are often described as being approved by governments when single firm 
production is the most efficient choice, due to the economies of scale. 31 Though not exactly the 
same, one might raise the argument that it was most efficient to have a single booking agent 
providing talent to a territory, or a lone promoter running events in a city. 
This brings the focus to the second bylaw, which essentially made it the duty of each 
member to aid any other member in the defense of the latter' s Alliance-recognized territory 
against intruding competitors.32 There could have been a situation where having two promoters 
or booking agents in a given territory produced a beneficial market outcome, but such an 
experiment was rarely, if ever, allowed to occur. 
Some comparatively palatable methods were used to keep out unwanted competition in 
the territories, such as sending top wrestlers to a promoter in a member' s territory in order to 
draw all wrestling fans away from the shows produced by what were called "outlaw" 
promoters.33 However, the promoters were not above more aggressive tactics to keep out 
competition. An example would be the multitude of accusations that NW A members threatened 
the death of widely despised outlaw promoter Jack Pfefer, both verbally and with a firearms. 34 
Naturally, the result of this void of competition was promoters enjoying their various locations 
unopposed. 
However, one shouldn't consider the affiliated promoters much luckier than the outlaws. 
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Now that the NW A members became the sole suppliers of wrestling talent in a given location, 
affiliated promoters were at the mercy of their territorial booking agents and the NW A at large. 
As an example the booking agents required the promoters to pay fees for said agents' services, a 
part of what was earned from the events. 35 
Of course, the second bylaw also put discipline power in the hands of those higher up in 
the chain. Failure to comply with the system, even on a small level, could lead to heated conflict 
and even punishment, a punishment that all of the NW A was to respect. 
For instance, NWA member and Los Angeles promoter Johnny Doyle once received a 
ban from the NW A due to recognizing a world champion other than the designated NW A 
champion within his territory.36 This organization-wide ban would have put all of the "booker-
members" in the NWA on Doyle's list of enemies, and was enough to persuade him to comply 
with the demands of his superiors.37 
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Another illustration of these intra-organizational hazards comes from "Sonny" Myers, a 
wrestler who also dabbled in promoting, who once resisted paying a $100 booking fee to 
"Pinkie" George for running a wrestling event at a County Fair in Western Missouri.38 This 
action strongly offended George, to the point that Myers soon became convinced that he was 
being intentionally left off bookings in St. Louis by Member Sam Muchnik, as a punishment for 
his dissent.39 This perceived punishment eventually led Myers to file a lawsuit against George 
and the entire NW A (one of two antitrust lawsuits levied upon the NW A to be discussed in this 
piece), in which he tried to prove that George convinced NWA members to not utilize Myers, 
costing the wrestler substantial income.40 Though unsuccessful in the end, the nearly decade-long 
court battles dealt Myers a victory until it was overturned by appeal.41 These examples no doubt 
establish a degree of legitimacy to the idea that the NW A worked together to punish promoter 
infractions by any means they could. 
The third bylaw also demonstrated collusive tendencies. As seen in the example with Mr. 
Doyle, the NWA required that all members recognize the NWA World Heavyweight 
Championship holder as the sole world champion; no territory was to have its own version of the 
world title.42 In addition, it was agreed that the champion could never receive more than 10% of 
what was drawn in for the event in which he wrestled.43 
Both of the above requirements restrict competition. The first rule contained in the ·bylaw 
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forced individual NW A members to have, at best, a regional heavyweight championship that was 
constantly at their disposal, rather than a world champion that could be built up in eyes of the 
public as a wrestler legitimately holding said distinction.44 This is akin to the previously 
discussed idea of cartel members lowering the quality of the overall product, thus restricting 
value and increasing profit when fans clamored in to watch a rare appearance of the world 
champion. 
The second rule in this bylaw prevented promoters from trying to sway the champion to 
come to their territories for important events by means of offering increased compensation. The 
world champion was booked by the NW A president, and it could be argued that the president 
knew best what bookings would make the most financial sense in the industry.45 That said, the 
rule still prohibited one of the most important facets of free market competition: the natural 
movement of resources to where they are most valued.46 
Finally, significant evidence of collusive behavior can be found in the organization' s 
ninth bylaw. This rule operated in a similar manner to the second bylaw. It stated that the NW A 
would exercise dominion over the wrestlers; any wrestler who harmed a promoter could receive 
a suspension that would be enforced in the entire NWA.47 A suspension could be lifted once the 
wrestler and promoter reached agreement, but that fact takes little away from the power of this 
rule.48 
As seen before, the NW A was creating a situation that would allow each member to be in 
control of wrestling in his territory without any outside competition. A means to this end was the 
control of the wrestlers themselves.49 The booking agents of the NWA put the area wrestlers into 
contracts that would allow a member of any affiliation level to exact vengeance on 
insubordination. 50 Anything from actual dissension, to what was described by professional 
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wrestlingresearcher Tim Hornbaker as "specifically antagonizing a member," could get a 
wrestler "blacklisted."51 It could be argued that these suspensions were the equivalent to putting 
wrestlers out of work because wrestling for an outlaw promotion was cause for suspension in its 
own right. 52 As shoWfl previously, the subject of blacklisting was present in "Sonny" Myer's 
antitrust lawsuit (and it will also be discussed when the other major antitrust suit is analyzed). 53 
While this practice of suspension was used sparingly within a few years after the NWA's 
founding, this was only because ofthe economic harm that was being caused to the members. 54 
Further, the threat of suspension, as well as the contracts held by the booking agents, still 
allowed members to apply coercive pressure to the wrestlers.55 Obviously, just the fear ofbeing 
blacklisted was enough to scare Myers into taking legal action. 56 
Such an uneven balance of power in the hands of the wrestling promoters and booking 
agents affected the standing of wrestlers for worse, to say the least. One agent, Eddie Quinn, 
went so far as to once exclaim that a wrestler, Edouard Carpenter, was his property. 57 To the 
NW A, the wrestlers were not business partners, but rather raw materials. -
These adverse feelings towards the wrestlers can be best exemplified in the meek rewards 
earned by the wrestlers for their efforts. "Baron" Michele Leone, who wrestled against NW A 
World Heavyweight Champion Lou Thez in a title unification match that headlined the first ever 
professional wrestling event to generate $100,000 in ticket sales, certainly fits into this 
example. 58 Despite being in the main event for such a lucrative endeavor, Leone received a net 
payment of only $2,200, less than 3% of the total profit earned. 59 Even worse, aside from world 
champion Lou Thez, Leone likely received the highest pay out of all the wrestlers competing that 
night, given his main-event status. Johnny Doyle, the member that OWfled Leone's contract, 
made himself and his partners rich off of a man who had no choice but to comply. 60 
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This ninth bylaw draws many parallels to antitrust issues that have existed, or continue to 
exist in the sports world today. A first example is the reserve clause in Major League Baseball. 
This rule, when it was in effect, essentially bound baseball players to the initial major league 
team or minor league affiliate that signed them. 61 Other teams in the major or minor leagues 
were forbidden entering into negotiations with baseball players that had already been 
contractually bound to a team anywhere in the baseball hierarchy.62 For years, this rule remained 
intact throughout multiple examinations by the Supreme Court, not because of it being beneficial 
to the free market, but because of baseball ' s previously awarded antitrust exemption.63 
While the reserve clause no longer has power in modem day baseball, another sporting 
entity has been accused of antitrust violation for a similar rule.64 The NCAA, no stranger to 
accusations of restricting free market competition, has a rule that penalizes student-athletes who 
decide to transfer to another school.65 With a few exceptions, the NCAA requires that said 
transferring student-athletes must wait one year before they may re-enter the sports they play at 
their current schools. 66 Though no court decision has yet abolished this rule, on grounds related 
to collusion or otherwise, the rule has been challenged academically; the NCAA and its member 
colleges are accused of enforcing this penalty due to how it benefits the schools, using this 
disruption of market forces to compel profitable athletes to stay put and continue pumping 
revenue into their current college.67 Such similarities between the two mentioned cases and the 
previously discussed NW A bylaw allows for an understanding of just how much collusive power 
the rule contained. In fact, MLB ' s and the NCAA's rules seem almost tame by comparison. 
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Chapter 2 
The Maintenance of Collusive Power 
By today' s standards, it's almost unbelievable that so many credibly collusive actions 
were practiced by the NWA. For one thing, while sports entities such as Major League Baseball 
were able to secure antitrust exemption from the US government, other significant organizations 
like the NFL have yet to succeed in their appeals for similar treatment. 68 These exemptions were 
not and have not been provided liberally in the world of athletics. 
In fact, the NW A essentially received the opposite of such an exemption. As mentioned 
previously, the NWA experienced two significant lawsuits in the Federal Court System that had 
to do with its collusive practices (one of which has already been examined). Yet the NW A was 
able to weather the storm that was brought upon them and continue on as an organization. 69 
This is particularly extraordinary when one considers the fact that the NW A was going 
through their antitrust lawsuits around the very same time the world of professional boxing was 
having very similar legal issues.70 But while the NWA withstood the tests laid before it, those 
caught colluding in boxing were forced not only to disband, but to completely divest from any-
and-all interests in the sport. 71 What was the trick ofthe NWA? 
The remarkable endurance of the NW A goes past mere legal challenges. Economic 
questions remain unanswered. There is a high likelihood that cartels will fail, for reasons outside 
of the legal troubles they may face; disagreement among colluding firms, as well as the benefits 
that could, potentially, be reaped by a firm betraying its partners, represent just some ofthe 
explanations used for the natural causes that end or prevent cartels. 72 
This latter example is demonstrated in the widely known "prisoner's dilemma" problem, 
which is often used to illustrate how a firm's pursuit of its best, or "dominant" individual 
strategy leads said firm away from the cartel agreement and towards an overall worse situation 
for all parties in the cartel. 73 How was the NW A able to survive what a significant portion of the 
population would likely describe as futile? 
Starting with the NWA's survival of its legal woes, it is worthwhile to consider the rent-
seeking activities ofthe NWA members. The practice ofrent-seeking, which includes any 
business' s use of resources to attain or secure some type of economic gain without an added 
societal benefit, is often closely tied to government power and legislation. 74 A classic example is 
when firms spend large sums on lobbying congress to pass legislation that hinders international 
competition from flooding the market with the same products at lower prices, such as what is 
seen in the sugar industry.75 Money, in this case, is spent not to add value to the market, but 
rather to take what value already exists and reallocate it to the rent-seeking party.76 
Though not practiced quite the same way as typically described in rent-seeking, via 
government lobbying and campaigning, the essence of the concept is still found within the 
-
actions of the NW A. Many members had connections with government officials of all different 
levels, even with the athletic commissions that controlled who could become licensed in the 
wrestling industry. 77 
The dealings ranged from friendships, such as that between NW A president Sam 
Muchnik and Missouri Congressman Mel Price, to political contributions and bribery, to possible 
outright manipulation and control. 78 The NW A leveraged these relationships to maintain their 
dominance. 
For instance, there is sizable evidence that Mo:r;ris Siegel, an NWA member out of San 
Antonio, Texas, had -paid his way into becoming the "puppeteer" ofthe Texas Labor 
Commission, and therefore was well-placed to block any potential competition.79 When 
wrestler-turned-hopeful-promoter Sterling "Dizzy" Davis applied for a license 1949, Siegel 
allegedly threw his weight over the commission in the way of Davis' s venture, along with his 
lawyer and anything else that could block the unwanted competitor. Siegel was not putting his 
resources towards offering a better product than his potential competitor, but rather devoting 
energy to prevent competition altogether. 80 
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In addition to helping bolster the NWA's collusive practices, it is reasonable to believe 
that these political allies are what shielded the NW A from repercussions in their antitrust 
litigation. Particularly in the initial case, United States v. The National Wrestling Alliance, there 
is evidence that various members of the US government were responsible for the alliance's 
survival. 81 
As mentioned previously, NWA president Sam Muchnik had personal ties to 
Congressman Mel Price. It was alleged that this contact was utilized to reduce the severity of the 
Department of Justice' s inquiry and subsequent decisions involving the Alliance's fate. 82 There 
are also member Cal Eaton's mysterious connections in Washington to consider. During the 
impending court case, Eaton had a meeting with several unnamed figures in the nation's capital, 
which has been alluded to as NWA's saving grace.83 
In the end, a court decision that could have led the NW A doWTI the path of disinvestment 
boxing was forced upon was heavily mitigated into something much more palatable. The NW A 
agreed to a consent decree, a legal outcome that allowed the NW A to change its practices that the 
Department of Justice found inappropriate, in exchange for the US Government ceasing further 
prosecution of the Alliance and its members. 84 The NW A would have to alter its bylaws, such as 
by eliminating all rules that defined a member's territory and those that allowed for any sort of 
blacklisting of promoters and wrestlers for working outside of the Alliance. 85 Still, the group was 
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allowed to exist, and no direct punishment was levied on any of the members. 86 
Further, the members themselves were merely motivated to be more secretive about their 
collusive practices, engaging in even more rent-seeking. 87 If anything changed, it was merely 
how discipline was administered to those who crossed or irritated someone connected to the 
NW A; as an example, a vocal and disruptive wrestler in one territory might be promised an 
excellent position in another member's territory, only to never be employed by the member upon 
arriving in the new region. 88 And of course, complaints still rained down upon the NW A 
regarding their collusive efforts. 89 So why did the government not take further action against the 
organization after there was evidence that the NW A members were breaking their agreements in 
the consent decree? 
One of the likely reasons, according to Hornbaker, is the relationship members Roy 
Welch and Nick Gulas had with United States Senator and professional wrestling fan Estes 
Kefauver.9° Kefauver, who became chair of the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on antitrust and 
monopoly in 1957, enjoyed a tenure that was highlighted by his part in putting a stop to the 
collusive efforts in boxing, as well as an attempt to curtail baseball's antitrust exemption.91 
Despite the Senator's apparent proclivity to defend competition, no significant action was taken 
against the NW A under his watch. 92 Welch and Gulas might just be to thank for that. 
In addition, by the time Kefauver left his chair position in 1963, the NWA had a new 
shield that protected them from the arms ofthe law: "competition."93 In the late 1950's, former 
NW A World Junior Heavyweight Champion Verne Gagne and previously mentioned NW A 
charter witness Wally Karbo, began running their own territory based out of Minneapolis, 
Minnesota.94 This territory, going under the name "American Wrestling Association" recognized 
its own AWA World Heavyweight Champion, which, mentioned previously, was one ofthe 
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cardinal prohibitions first established by the NW A.95 Around this same period, Vincent J 
McMahon, "Toots" Mandt, and their "Capitol Wrestling Corporation" began running the 
Northeast United States under the "World Wide Wrestling Federation" banner.96 Again, another 
wrestler, different from the NWA World Heavyweight Champion, was recognized in McMahon 
and Mandt's domain.97 
Development of these additional leagues leaves the impression that the Department of 
Justice and the US Government at Large had improved the competitive environment; the NW A 
now had competition in professional wrestling. All was not as it seemed, however. 
Though technically in violation of the NWA's rules, the A WA and WWWF were by no 
means adversaries to the Alliance. All three organizations interacted with one another on a 
cooperative level and even held joint events, which of course would lead to the benefit of all the 
parties involved.98 
While on occasion, these entities would compete for dominance in individual cities, this 
was still very much a functioning cartel that respected one another's boundaries.99 Other smaller, 
insular territories would also form as time distanced the NW A from its antitrust issues, but it was 
all more of the same. 100 While it may have done something to assuage the concerns of 
wrestling's antitrust opponents, this "competition" was nothing short of a fac;ade. 
The successful hiding of criminalizing evidence was another practice exercised by the 
NW A to protect themselves from further antitrust lawsuits. A contributing factor that led to the 
escalation of the Department of Justice' s investigation towards a trial was what information was 
found during the inspection of the files owned by NW A members Sam Muchnik and Fred 
Kohler.101 Due to the fact that a paper trail can lead to a government probe, the complete 
avoidance of incriminating evidence is crucial to a collusive agreement' s success.102 The NWA 
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no doubt took to this knowledge in its post-litigation life, as those continuing the collusive ways 
within the NW A took actions to ensure that no traces of their behaviors were left to be 
discovered. 103 
As far as explaining the NW A's survival in light of more conceptual and academic 
knowledge, the answers lie within a more advanced understanding of collusion and cartels than 
what the public may know. 
For instance, the previously mentioned prisoner' s dilemma raises questions about the 
success of collusion when self-interest stands in the way of decisions that would best benefit the 
group. However, the common Understanding ofthis example operates under the assumption that 
the scenario and subsequent decisions occur only once. 104 While this information is useful, it 
does little to tell us what happens in situations like what was faced by the NWA's members. 
What happens when the decision between colluding and competing occur seemingly in 
perpetuity? 
In these "repeated-game" scenarios, those involved in the collusive efforts can be made to 
answer for their crimes against the cartel by a wide array of means. 105 A classic example, known 
as the "tit-for-tat strategy," is practiced when a cartel member cheats against his partner only if 
his partner cheated in the previous decision scenario.106 The latter occurrence of cheating is used 
as a punishment upon the first cheating cartel member. 107 The ultimate result, in theory, is that 
this continuous situation will incentivize the member firms to continue in the collusive actions 
due to the raised costs of cheating. 108 
Fred Kohler, an NW A member based out of Chicago, provided a decent illustration of 
"tit-for-tat." Kohler began to sour to the organization once fellow members Paul Bowser, Al 
Haft, and "Toots" Mondt began trying to enter his territory as competition. 109 The situation went 
from bad to worse as Kohler began to feel that the NWA's governing members were making 
·decisions that were influenced by personal biases. 110 
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In light of this, Kohler decided that he would also cheat on the NW A's agreements as he 
saw fit. 111 It could be argued that this was at least part of what led the disgruntled NW A member 
to stand his ground and establish Verne Gagne as the NW A United States Heavyweight 
Champion, despite the protests from NW A World Heavyweight Champion Lou Thez that the 
new title infringed on his status as the sole world champion of the NW A. 112 While Kohler 
eventually relented by changing the name ofthe title, it was only after much effort by NW A 
president Sam Muchnik. 113 Such a waste of energy and resources could very well have been 
avoided had Kohler not felt betrayed by his supposed NW A allies in the first place. 
Though in Mr. Kohler's case the rules and regulations might have been applied too 
lightly on his supposed allies, this was definitely not typical throughout the NWA's life. All the 
bylaws and practices of the NWA that had been previously discussed led to the NWA's own 
unique methods of attempting to lower the perceived value of cheating upon the collusive 
agreement. As already seen, when rebellion took place, the NW A could take action against the 
transgressor. 
Another great example ofthis was when Al Haft, an NWA member based in Columbus, 
also broke the NWA bylaws by recognizing his own world champion within his territory. 114 To 
make matters worse, Haft would schedule the NW A World Heavyweight Champion to appear at 
events in his territory that featured what were considered a subpar lineups of bouts, further 
harming the credibility of the NWA champion as the best wrestler on the planet. 115 The NWA' s 
punishment: cutting Haft off from use of its world championship. 116 The NW A president, 
responsible for booking the champion in the various territories, left Haft off the schedule, taking 
away the booking agent's expected income that would have been generated by the anticipated 
appearance of the world titleholder. 117 Since engagement in the wrestling industry was an 
ongoing affair for Haft, rather than a one-time occurrence, his actions were disciplined by his 
injured partners. 
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Another aspect that differs from the more basic, common models of collusive agreements 
is the fact that the NW A was not made up of members that each possessed equal power. There 
were many territories that were more profitable than others, and the members rurming these 
wealthier regions had more power within the Alliance. 118 
Such power, when used appropriately, can be a tool for sustaining the life of a collusive 
agreement; that is, the strength of a dominant firm can be used as a threat, rather than 
exercised. 119 Weaker parties being made aware ofthe disparity of power can increase a collusive 
group's cohesion because the weaker parties understand that agreeing to partake in the collusive 
actions is their best chance of maintaining their business at a profitable level. 120 
This buttress to the NWA's power was described in an anecdote from longtime wrestling 
industry member Jim Cornette. 121 According to Cornette, Vincent J. McMahon (whose company 
actually rejoined the NW A in 1971, after splitting off of in 1963) was financially capable of 
buying just about any wrestler he wanted, and the NW A members and other territory owners 
knew this. 122 However, McMahon's approach to bringing new wrestling talent into his territory 
was to give notice of his intent to whomever was currently using this wrestler. 123 In addition, 
Cornette said that McMahon would also try to give something beneficial to the other territory 
head, such as an additional week's use of McMahon's prized wrestler and attraction, Andre the 
Giant. 124 Rather than use natural market forces to get what human capital he wanted, McMahon 
would both enslire that his needs were met and that the cartel remained profitable for all those 
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involved, even the "weaker" members. 
A final consideration pertaining to how the NW A and other territories maintained their 
power comes from the ideas that were submitted by economist Sherwin Rosen's 1981 work, 
"The Economics of Superstars." In this work, Rosen argues that modem performance industries 
are the result of a movement away from those with mediocre talent and toward the "superstars" 
who are in the top of their field. 125 Among other things, this is attributed to the increase in 
technology, which allows for a "superstar's" talents to be distributed to more people than ever 
before. 126 As an example, LeBron James is able to share his talent of playing basketball with 
people around the world due to the power of television, internet, and social media; yet he is 
exerting no more effort than if he were performing solely for those in attendance at a single 
game. 
This power that television brought to the entertainment industry is why Rosen's work is 
so applicable in this situation. Various NW A members entered into the television industry by 
airing matches on various networks and using the publicity to further increase in-person audience 
attendance. 127 Through this new business avenue, certain wrestlers, such as Lou Thez and Verne 
Gagne, became well recognized names in the wrestling industry, just like any other sports 
industry has witnessed with their athletes. 128 
However, this situation arguably harmed many more wrestlers than it helped. For while 
outstanding wrestlers such as Thez, Gagne, or later, Ric Flair would become famous on a global 
scale for their abilities, there were several other wrestlers who did not receive such star power. 129 
Naturally, a lack of fame could easily transform into a lack of payment. Promoter Cal Eaton and 
full NWA member Johnny Doyle, while partnered in their territory in Southern California, were 
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in a position where they were both bringing in new revenues through advertising on their 
television shows, while simultaneously barely compensating their wrestlers for their appearances 
on the programming. 13° Considering how beneficial television was to stars like Gagne in 
Chicago, it could certainly be argued that this disregard for high compensation in Southern 
California stemmed from the fact that these wrestlers were not household names in a time when 
such a phenomenon became possible. 131 As such, the NWA was able to secure its position not 
only as a cartel of sellers for wrestling performances, but also as a cartel of buyers for wrestling 
talent. 
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Chapter 3 
The Downfall of the Cartel 
After all these factors have been considered, one must be curious as to why and how the 
NWA-is not the premiere group in professional wrestling anymore. Ifthe NWA and company 
had the wrestling industry bound in such a way that it could control or eliminate any dissenting 
industry member, why is the modem National Wrestling Alliance an organization serving only a 
niche market and whose very world championship is questioned on its legitimacy?132 
An initial problem that was difficult for the NW A to tackle was the lingering 
consequences of United States v. National Wrestling Alliance. As mentioned previously, the 
NWA did manage to survive the government's investigation and subsequent legal challenges, but 
at the expense of amending their bylaws and ostensibly eliminating any practices that restricted 
competition. Of course, it has been demonstrated that various NW A members opted to continue 
their ways, just with a higher degree of stealth. Despite this, the years following the NW A 
lawsuits saw heavy losses of membership within the Alliance. 133 Simply put, there was not a 
perceived benefit to being a part of the NW A if it was unable to control wrestling like it had in 
its initial years. 134 
Another difficulty faced by the NW A was the constant cheating by members of the cartel. 
Though the previously mentioned checks against cheating were in place during the NW A's 
tenure as dominating force in the industry, there are still many examples of self-serving actions 
taken by various NW A members that either went undiscovered or unpunished. For instance, 
there were many attempts made by members to get their. television programs on the networks in a 
rival's territory. 135 Considering the benefits of television exposure for a promoter in a major city, 
it is obvious that such encroachment would hardly be described as protection of a fellow 
member's territory. 136 
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The lack of punishment is more understandable when recalling the power disparities that 
existed between the members of the Alliance. Clearly, it would be much harder to levy penalties 
onto an offending member if he was one of the elite in the organization. When some NW A 
members were using their strength to guide the NW A to collectively profitable ends, others used 
it to leech off the NWA's fraternal commitments. 137 
Sam Muchnik left the NW A presidency in 1960, after a tenure entirely dedicated to 
keeping NWA alive and well. 138 One of his successors, Doc Sarpolis from Amarillo, ran the 
NW A from 1962-1963 and did so while recognizing a different world champion than the NW A 
titleholder. 139 Sarpolis, obviously strong enough within the alliance to gain the support needed to 
be elected president, was breaking a central tenant of the NWA's pact for his own gain. 140 It is 
startling that the NW A would put a leader in place who so obviously was disregarding a 
foundational aspect of the group's control. 
Though Muchnik would soon return to the presidency in 1963 and stay until1975, his 
other suc.cessors still helped create an environment of self-interest in the NWA. 141 Former 
wrestler and NWA member Frtiz Von Erich (real name John Adkisson) took Muchnik' s spot 
next.142 Though also recognized as less successful than Muchnik at moderating, Von Erich's 
individual pursuits after his departure from the presidency are what bear mentioning. 143 
Von Erich, through his "World Class Championship Wrestling" promotion, provided a 
platform to showcase his many sons who ventured into professional wrestling. 144 In addition, 
Von Erich used his clout in the NW A to protect his boys from anything that would harm their 
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image, even on a national scale; by 1980, he was pushing for one to be the NW A World 
Heavyweight Champion.145 This was despite the fact that his sons were consistently under the 
influence of drugs, to the point where it would negatively affect the quality of matches. 146 Fritz 
Von Erich used his power in such a way that his family benefited in the short run, at the expense 
ofhis fellow members. 147 
The leaders weren't the only ones who went into business for themselves. Several NWA 
members were beginning to look at the how to best use the NW A to· get what they themselves 
desired. A common method of doing this was by allowing the NW A World Heavyweight 
Champion to lose the title to a regional star when the former was appearing in the latter's 
territory, only to have the regional star lose it back in short succession. 148 Giant Baba, wrestler 
and owner of All Japan Pro Wrestling, had three reigns as the world champion, all of which 
lasted less than one week, and all of which went against the idea of the original NW A bylaw. 149 
Baba winning the title may have helped his territory in Japan, but did nothing to help, say, Eddie 
Graham in Florida. 150 If anything, it could be argued that such an action weakened the overall 
perception of the currently reigning champion, making him appear to less indomitable. 
Baba wasn't alone; several members got the champion to drop the belt to their local top 
wrestlers, further demonstrating the movement away from the unified strides made by the NW A 
members of past generations.151 
The final, and arguably most apparent factor leading to the fall ofthe NWA, as well as 
the entirety of territorial based wrestling, is a variation of an issue typically known to cause 
problems for cartels. It is often suspected that the perception of success within an industry 
experiencing collusion will incentivize new firms to enter the market, thus diluting the power 
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currently vested in existing members. 152 However, rather than an entirely new firm entering the 
wrestling industry, this new threat to the NWA's status quo was within its list of supposed allies. 
Vincent Kennedy McMahon, son ofWWWF-at this point shortened to World Wrestling 
Federation- owner Vincent J McMahon, purchased his father's Capitol Wrestling Corporation, 
and thus ownership ofthe WWF, in 1982.153 However, the plans of the junior McMahon were by 
no means to continue the artificial, symbiotic territory relationships of his father. This new 
territory owner (who will be referred to as "McMahon" for the rest of this piece) had a much 
larger vision, one of a presence well outside the Northeast United States. 154 
First of all, McMahon was not about to respect the territorial regions that had been so 
long segmented by the NW A and its allies. 155 He began running shows in areas often considered 
the domain of opposing territories, such as in St. Louis. 156 Bret Hart, when recalling a time he 
attended an NWA convention with his father and Alliance member Stu Hart in 1983, told the 
story of another member, Ole Anderson, publically confronting McMahon about encroaching on 
his sphere of control. 157 McMahon's response was simply to stand up and exit the meeting. 
Clearly, McMahon was not interested in being a part of the cartel. The WWF' s new head saw 
Anderson, and all other members, as his competition. 
To this new competition, McMahon offered a clear choice. The members could sell their 
territorial assets to the WWF, or they could be defeated in head-to-head competition. 158 Some 
territory owners did take McMahon up on his offer; for example, Stu Hart chose to sell his 
territory, "Stampede Wrestling" to the WWF when the opportunity arose in 1984.159 Another 
famous example, referred to in the wrestling industry as "Black Saturday," saw Jack and Jerry 
Brisco sell their stake in the "Georgia Championship Wrestling" territory to McMahon, allowing 
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for the WWF to air their programming in the former's TBS timeslot. 160 
Those who opted to fight against McMahon soon found their television programs 
usurped, rather than traded. The power of cable television allowed McMahon to get his product 
before the eyes of fans nation-wide, further pushing the WWF alternative in those markets. 161 
The WWF would go to the network stations, offer its product, and take its rivals' timeslots. 162 
Television time wasn't the only asset that McMahon wanted to take from his competitors. 
The financial power of the WWF lured many of the best wrestlers of each territory into the fold, 
strengthening the Federation's roster of competitors while simultaneously starving the various 
territories of their most famous faces.163 This was a process that was far different than the type of 
forced cooperation that Vincent J McMahon had conducted prior; this was a traditional use of 
economic resources to get desired talent. 164 
One such wrestler McMahon acquired in this manner was a young and extraordinarily 
charismatic man within the A WA, who went by the ring name Hulk Hogan. 165 Hogan is 
undoubtedly the most recognized wrestler of all time, and it could be argued that his 
marketability was the spear-head of the WWF brand. 
Speaking of which, it bears mentioning that the WWF product was certainly 
differentiated from its territorial contemporaries of the time. There were a number of differences 
between what the WWF offered and the simulation of reality widely practiced and accepted in 
the territories. 166 The talent seen on WWF programming became what were described by former 
wrestler Michael Hayes as "cartoon characters," which were arguably more marketable to a 
younger audience. 167 
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In addition, WWF developed a partnership with the new MTV, which allowed the WWF 
to target a larger market, those who might have otherwise not been interested in professional 
wrestling. 168 Wrestling was showrJ on MTV, but it was but only one piece of the offerings 
provided by what is knowrJ as the "Rock n' Wrestling Connection." 169 Wrestlers were appearing 
in music videos and even on a cartoon show, Hulk Hogan 's Rock n' Wrestling. 170 This was 
certainly different than the demonstration of athletics that was offered in the NWA' s product. 
Perhaps the greatest example of how the WWF differentiated itself from its competition 
was its first "WrestleMania." This 1985 event was held in Madison Square Garden, and offered 
around the country on what was called "closed-circuit," where people paid to watch the event en 
masse on a large screen. 171 This was nothing new; "Jim Crockett Promotions," an NWA territory 
in Charlotte, North Carolina, had offered its "Starrcade" event in 1983 worldwide via closed-
circuit. The difference in this case was that "WrestleMania" featured not just wrestlers, but a 
myriad of stars and celebrities from across media. 172 Consider the main event, which saw Hulk 
Hogan team up with famous actor Mr. T, and was preempted by an appearance by the Rockettes, 
had Liberace as the special guest time-keeper, baseball player Billy Martin as the special guest 
announcer, and Muhamad Ali as the 2nd, outside referee. 173 The presence of such star power 
could be seen as the catalyst that allowed the WWF to transcend from a mere wrestling company 
into an immensely popular brand that entertained-and continues to entertain- countless people, 
including those outside the professional wrestling fan base. 174 
The ability of the WWF to alter its product and appeal to a wider audience was 
undoubtedly beneficial in the company' s move towards being an industry leader. Appealing to 
the tastes of the market is a key factor in the level of demand a product experiences, and the 
increased consumer base certainly helped the WWF entrench itself as an impenetrable barrier 
against the territories. 175 
The NWA's members did tried to rally against the WWF's attempt to take over the 
wrestling business. After all, the whole point of the organization was to allow the various 
members to combat competition from a position of strength. The remaining NW A members 
(several wrestling promotions aligned with the NWA had been forced to close between the late 
70's and early 80's), the A WA, and others pooled resources to create a joint wrestling 
promotion, known as Pro Wrestling USA. 176 This new group tried to create events loaded with 
what high-profile talent they had left, which culminated in an event called "Super Clash," that 
brought in approximately $150,000 worth of ticket sales. 177 
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Alas, even in the face of pending doom, the territorial representatives were unable to 
work through their individual interests for the sake of survival. 178 Greg Gagne, son of A W A 
owner Verne Gagne, even recalled NW A member Jim Crockett trying to lure away A W A talent 
when he was at the "Superclash" event. 179 The group' s members each had their own agendas, 
causing the partnership to be short-lived. 180 
With all ofthese factors combined, the NWA continued to dwindle, both in size and 
power. By the end ofthe 1980' s the NWA contained, at best, one-quarter ofthe amount of 
members it had before United States v. National Wrestling Alliance.181 At this time, the only 
member that still had any power was Jim Crockett. 182 Crockett sold the rights of his promotion to 
Ted Turner in 1988, which did help get the NWA more exposure. 183 Though now referred to as 
"World Championship Wrestling" the revived product was still considered a part of the 
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Alliance. 184 However, World Championship Wrestling eventually split from what was left ofthe 
NWA, quite possibly leaving the Alliance the weakest it had been at that point.185 
The A W A closed its doors in 1990.186 The NW A, on the other hand, still exists today. 187 
Though it has had some fluctuating rises and falls in popularity and recognition, it is hardly the 
collusive force it once was. 188 In fact, all ofthe organizations bylaws were voided in 2005. 189 
The cartel agreement that once allowed for a firm grasp on the wrestling industry is no longer 
enforced. 
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Conclusion 
The NWA's members, affiliated promoters and wrestlers, and even its "independent" 
allies provide not only a wonderful illustration of collusion, but also a timeline of its genesis, 
dominance, downfall, and destruction. By analyzing the history ofthe NWA and synthesizing it 
with the research done on collusion and cartels, one can observe various features of collusive 
behavior put into effect by the bylaws and practices ofthe NW A, see how the organization was 
able to prolong its life and deflect the common hazards predicted to end cartel agreements, and 
how self-interest, both within and outside the group, became too much for the various territories 
to fight against. The entire lifecycle of this cartel demonstrates a complete, practical example of 
what is taught and predicted within the field of economics. 
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